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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1947*
DONALD H. WoLLrxtI

I. ECONOMIC POWER AND COLLECTIVE BARGAININGA RATIONALIZATION

T

HE UNDERLYING THESIS

of this critique is the notion that we are

irrevocably committed to a federal labor policy of encouraging the
establishment and maintenance of collective bargaining relationships.
The economic wisdom of collective bargaining as a policy is somewhat beyond the scope of this discussion, yet some observations seem
appropriate.
Collective bargaining means, among other things, price-fixing in the
labor market on a large scale. This is.perhaps a strange kind of activity to encourage in light of our historical lip-service to the notions
of free competition. Yet we have never been quite sure whether competition means price competition or "fair" price competition, or
* This article is limited to a treatment of Title I of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.
(Supp. July, 1947), which amends the Wagner Act by substantially rewriting it and
which is herein termed the National Labor Relations Act of 1947
Title II, wluch deals with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (formerly the United States Conciliation Service) and national emergency strikes and
lockouts, Title III, which establishes.substantive-Tghts for private parties and defines
some new crimes, and Title IV, which sets up a Joint Senate-House Committee to study
and report on labor relations, are not discussed.
For two different approaches to the Taft-Hartley Act, see Cox, Some Aspects. o
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,. 61 H~iv. L. REV. 1, 274 (1947, 1948) and
Watt, The New Deal Court, Orgaised Labor, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 7 LAwyERs
GUILD REvIEw 193, 237 (1947).
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington Law School, -Seattle.
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whether a free market means one in which prices are free from both
private and public controls or one in which business men are free to
destroy their competitors and impose their own controls.'
Even under the Sherman Act the courts have apparently been more
concerned with the abuses of private price-fixing than they have been
with private price-fixing itself.' And clearly the Sherman Act has not
prevented the concentration of corporate power.' The rapid growth
of vast corporate empires has produced an economy in which more
and more people depend upon fewer and fewer people for their econonic welfare,' and it is not surprising that workers have sought to
exercise some control over their own destinies by forming powerful
trade unions.
The trade union is, among other things, the workers' device for
getting a larger share of the national income. It seems fair to say that
we have helped to make the large-scale development of this institution
inevitable (and economically necessary) by permitting the tremendous
growth of the corporate structure as the business man's device for
getting a larger share of the national income.
In addition to the political difficulties involved in establishing "free"
labor markets by emasculating a trade union movement with about
15,000,ooo members, we face the fact that such a policy would probably be econoucally unsound unless it were coupled with limitations
on corporate power achieved by limiting corporate size. Paragraph
two of Section i of the Wagner Act5 made the point:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who
are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing
power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of
competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
I Compare the term "competition" as used in Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. 499
(1867), and by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167
Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) with the same term as used by SiMONS, A Positive
Programfor Laissez-Fasre,in EcoNomic PoLICY FOR A FREE SocarY 40 (1948).
2 See Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. OF CHL L. REv. 153 (1947).
8 Ibd.
4 In 1944, 31 per cent of the workers in manufacturing were employed by firms with
10,000 or more employees, 62 per cent were employed by firms with 500 or more employees. Id. at 165.
5 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1940).
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Pumping purchasing power into the hands of the mass of consumers
in order to convert desire into effective demand and implement the
achievement of high levels of production and employment is certainly
not a problem in 1948 (as it so clearly was in 1935). But the problem

of the distribution of income remains. The point which the labor
force's percentage takes of the national income must hit in order to
sustain effective demand for our national product is speculative and
highly controversial, but surely the fact that the percentage of the
national income which goes into wages and salaries has declined since
1945 and is approaching the level of 1929 is a source of some concern.'
Fiscal policy, including the progressive income tax device, is one
method for implementing the achievement of an equitable and sound
distribution of income. But the 8oth Congress has partially rejected
tins philosophy, with the result that the take of the national income
which any man or group gets is even more clearly a function of economic power than it was before. The fact remains in 1948, then, that
workers cannot expect to get the share which they need in order to
sustain their standards of living (and which the requirements of a
full employment-full production economy demand that they get)
without their own instrument of economic power, the trade union.
In summary, it is politically unsound and economically impracticable
to emasculate the trade union as an instrument of economic power
unless the other great instruments of economic power-chiefly the
corporation-are similarly emasculated. But who is to advocate, in a
world situation where production is an urgent necessity, the economic
atomization of the productive structures that dominate, for example,
steel, rubber, oil, and automobiles?
The small producer probably has a future something like that of the
dodo bird. Orgamzation seems to be the immediate answer for the
IIn

Billionsof Dollars

Percent of the NationalIncome
Net
Atational Wages and Corporate Wages and Net CorpoIncome
Salaries
Profits Salaries rateProfits
1929
$ 87.4
$ 502
$ 8.4
57%
9.6%
1933
39.6
28.8
-0.4
73
1939
72.5
45.7
5.0
63
6.9
1940
81.3
49.6
6.4
61
7.9
1941
103.8
61.7
9.4
59
9.0
1942
136.5
81.7
9.4
60
6.9
1943
168.3
105.5
10.4
62
6.2
1944
182.3
116.9,
9.9
64
5.4
1945
182.8
117.6
8.9
64
4.2.
1946
1782
111.1
12.5
62
7.0
1947
202.6
122.8
17.4
61
8.6
SURVEY oF CURRENT BusliNss, July 1947 Supplement, and February 1948 issue
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consumer and the nonunion worker. Thus we have erected, and are
continuing to erect, an economy which will function effectively only
so long as powerful private economic groups can agree and in which
the unorganized groups must protect themselves from exploitation
either by organizing or by granting vast amounts of regulatory power
to a centralized government (with the rather futile hope that the grant
will not become irrevocable)
This is the kind of economy in which the government must be highly
centralized, more powerful than any of the economic organizations
within it, and able to maintain balances of power, to restrict the private economic groups within it to the "reasonable" exercise of their
powers, and to invoke-when necessary-the coercive power of the
state to compel both agreement and compliance.
We can only hope that all groups remain "reasonable" - that is,
follow enlightened wage and price policies (or, at least, that when the
state does exercise its coercive power, the groups are more patriotic
than "unreasonable") and that the government (and the men who
run it) with all of its (and their) power will be wiser, more sensitive
to the common weal, and more willing to relinquish power should the
electorate demand relinquishment than any sense of realism can lead
us to expect.
To those libertarians who believe that power always corrupts and
that econormc and political freedom are indivisible," the future (the
present?) is not a happy one. Yet the trend seems clear, and until we
determine to strike at private concentrations of power wherever they
exist (a determination probably as impracticable in 1948 as it is unlikely) collective bargaining belongs in our economic picture.
II. THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AS FEDERAL LABOR POLICY
The passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by Congress in 19328
withdrew from the federal courts the effective remedy for those persons injured by the activities of trade unions-the injunction.
This negative encouragement of the development of trade unionism
was followed in 935 by the Wagner Act,' which put the Federal Government into the business of actively and positively promoting the
establishment of collective bargaining relationships. The rationale for
7 See SImoNs, A Politlical Credo, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, in EcoNomic
POLICY IN A FREE SocIrTY 1, 121 (1948).
847 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1940).

949 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1940).
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tins governmental activity was largely the purchasing power-distribution of income theories mentioned above, and the result of the activity
was a tremendous expansion in the size, scope, and strength of trade
unions.
The United States Supreme Court made its contribution (a negative
but nonetheless effective one). First, it freed trade unions from the
restraints of the Sherman Act except when the umon and the employer
collusively engage in price-fixing in the products or services market °and perhaps as a practical matter it freed them even inthat situation."
Second, it identified peaceful picketing, a very effective economic
weapon, with free speech and thus immunized it-at least in partfrom legislative and judicial controls.
III. THE 1947 STATUTE AND SOME MAJOR SHIFTS
IN POLICY
A. The Right Not to Organize
The Wagner Act was grounded on the premise that collective bargaining could not achieve the economic objectives of the statute unlegs
large numbers of employees were represented by strong unions. To
recapitulate, these objectives were (i) prevention of depressed wage
rates wnch decrease the purchasing power of wage earners and aggravate business depressions, and (2) encouragement of the stabilization
of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between
industries because instability aggravates business depressions.
The National Labor Relations Act of 1947, while it sets out these
same objectives, 8 is grounded on the premise that collective bargaining can attain them whether or not employees are represented by strong
unions. To put this a different way, the 1947 statute assumes that it is
a matter of public mdifference whether or not collective bargaining
exists in a particular plant or mdustry
10 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941), Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local
No. 3, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797 (1945).
13 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. United States, 330 U. S. 395

(1947).

'12 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), American Federation of Labor v.
Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941), Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942), Cafeteria Employees Union
v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943). But cf. Milkwagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local
753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941), Carpenters and Joiners Umon of
America, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942), Gazzam v. Building Service
Employees Int'l Union, Local 262, 129 Wash. Dec. 455 (1947).
18 Section 1, paragraph 2.
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Nowhere is this assumption made clearer than in Section 7 winch
adds to the employees' right to engage in union activity (a carry-over
from the Wagner Act) "the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities.
"" The addition takes on significance when coupled with
the duty of employers (another carry-over) not to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights set out in Section 71" and the newly established duty of labor umons or their agents
not to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of those rights."8
While giving the right to refrain from union activity, equal status
with the right to engage in union activity establishes some legal obligations for employers, its primary impact is felt by unions and union
agents engaged in organizational campaigns. Making it an unfair labor
practice for a union or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right not to engage in union activity is one of the
policy shifts which has been widely defended, largely because of empirical data indicating that union organizers have in some instances
coerced employees into joining against their will by threatening violence to them and/or their families and engaging in other forms of
intimidation.
However, presumably a union organizer can propagandize with impunity, e.g., tell workers that they will be wage slaves if they don't
unionize. This presumption is strengthened by Section 8 (c) which
says, "expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemmation thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall
not constitute or be emdence of [italics supplied] an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.""7
14 "c
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized
in Section 8 (a) (3)." Briefly then, a union shop with a thirty-day minimum joining
period entered into by a union after a referendum of the employees may be enforced,
without violating § 7, against employees who do not tender periodic dues and fees.
1'
Section 8 (a) (1).
18 Section 8 (b) (1).
1T This section, although ostensibly incorporated in the statute to protect employer
freedom of speech, appears to afford broad immunities to union organizers. Under the
Wagner Act conduct, though evidenced in part by speech, could amount, in connection
with other circumstances, to coercion within the meaning of the act. If the total activities of an employer restrained or coerced his employees in their free choice, then those
employees were entitled to protection. And in determining whether a course of conduct
amounted to restraint or coercion, pressure exerted vocally by the employer was no
more disregarded than pressure exerted in other ways. NLRB v. Va. Electric & Power
Co., 314 U. S. 469, 477 (1941). Cf. NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.(2d)
993 (C.C.A. 2d 1943), Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 670 (C.C.A. 6th
1941).
The Senate bill stated that the finding of an unfair labor practice was not to be
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It seems reasonable to guess that most union organizational activity
which falls short of violence, threats of violence, fraud, or threats of
reprisal is privileged. Mass picketing, because of the implicit threat of
physical harm, is probably an unfair labor practice. On the other
hand, peaceful picketing for organizational purposes (except perhaps
in the "stranger" picketing situation) probably does not generally,
because of the notion that peaceful picketing is a form of speech, violate this section.
Closer questions are posed by threats to increase dues and fees if
the employee doesn't join before the union gets bargaining rights,
threats to obtain a union shop and get the worker discharged by denying him membership (frequently an effective kind of pressure, even
though such discrimination would now be unlawful), and promises of
benefit if the worker joins the union.
The above remarks are, of course, speculative. "Restraint" and "coercion" are labels the factual content of which will have to be defined
by extensive litigation. Given a tough construction, this section deals
very effective blows at trade union attempts to expand jurisdiction (for
examples, the organizational drives in the South of both the C.I.O. and
A.F of L.). Even given a soft interpretation, the section makes organizational activities more risky than they were heretofore. This is particularly true because, in determining whether or not a union is legally
responsible for the specific acts of an organizer, the question of actual
authorization or ratification is not controlling."'
based upon a statement of views or arguments, either written or oral, if it contained
under all the circumstances no threat, express or implied, of reprisal or force, or offer,
express or implied, of benefit. SEN. REP. no. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947).
(Emphasis supplied.) Deletion of "under all the circumstances" and "express or implied" from the final form of § 8 (c) casts real doubt on the vitality of the "totality
of conduct" doctrine. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 61 HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 15-20 (1947).
More important, § 8 (c) appears to preclude the NLRB from considering as evidence of an unfair labor p'ractice remarks which are not coercive, although apparently
the Board can consider remarks which are not coercive as evidence of no unfair labor
practice. No doubt § 8 (c) gives employers wider latitude in expressing attitudes
toward umonism than they enjoyed under the Wagner Act. But the latitude also extends to unions. What, for example, shall the Board do with the statement of a union
organizer who said to a nonunion employee who knew that two other nonunion workers
had been assaulted in the alley the previous night, "I think you will enjoy your job
more if you join up"? Such a remark contains no threat or promises. Is it to be considered as "coercive" u.der all the circumstances? Or is it to be excluded as inadmissible evidence? Or, if admitted, is it important only for purposes of judicial
review, that is, the determination of whether the findings of the Board with respect to
questions of fact are supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole"? See § 10 (e).
Is "In deternmning whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so
as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." Section 2 (13).
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There was some Congressional feeling that labor organizations
should be as neutral with respect to whether or not employees join
unions as employers. The deletion of "interfere" seems to indicate
(albeit only weakly) that this feeling did not prevail fully "9Nonetheless, something of an incongruity in federal labor policy has been
produced.
Only litigation will determine the degree to which the 8oth Congress,
by giving the right not to engage in collective bargaining equal status
with the right to engage in collective bargaining, contradicted itself.
But it seems clear that if Congress still thinks that collective bargaining
is in the public interest, it cannot logically be indifferent to whether or
not workers join unions.
B. Protection of the Collective Bargaining Relationship
1. By Agreement-Institutional Security for the Union
a. Limitations. Probably no aspect of the trade union movement is
so controversial as the matter of union security agreements. There is
something unpalatable to the majority of Americans about an arrangement whereby membership in an organization is enforced by making
the opportunity to earn a livelihood partially contingent upon it. A
fortiori, an agreement which makes membership in a trade union essential before obtaining employment, i.e., the closed shop, has relatively
little popular support outside union circles.
Nonetheless, trade unionists in their quest for control over the job,
have historically sought to obtain some form of institutional security
against employer hostility and employee apathy The lack of classconsciousness of the typical American worker (as compared, for example, with the English worker) has created the problem of getting
new and/or apathetic employees into the union and keeping them there.
The closed shop is an old device for achieving these objectives. But
there are others-the union shop, maintenance of membership, preferential hiring. A well-developed institution of seniority rule is sufficient
in the railway industry, where the closed shop is outlawed."
19 Section 8 (a) (1) of the 1947 statute makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in § 7, while § 8 (b) (1) makes it unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents "to restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of those rights.
The words "interfere with" were included in the original draft of § 8 (b) (1),
SEN. REP. no. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947), 93 Cong. Rec. 4136 (April 25,
1947). They were deleted largely at the insistence of Senator Ives, id. at 4399 (April
30, 1947). Senator Taft stated that their elimination would not make any substantial
change in the meaning of the section. Ibid. See Cox, op. cit. supra note 17, at 30-34.
20 For an excellent discussion of union security see TONER, THE CLOSED SHOP
(1944).
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Union security is a natural outgrowth of collective bargaining. Predominant among the industries in which collective bargaining is relatively mature and in which closed shop conditions exist are the building
trades, printing, trucking, the maritime industries, coal mining, and
clothing manufacture.2 By and large, with the exception of coal mining
and the maritime industries, these have been the organized areas with
the highest degree of stability-that is, least number of work stoppages.
That union security should develop hand-m-hand with collective
bargaining and that these areas should be relatively stable is not surprising. Once a union has obtained majority support it cannot be expected to refrain from attempting to get control over all jobs in the
bargaining unit. Moreover, since the National Labor Relations Act
(both the Wagner Act and the z947 statute) imposes upon the union
with majority support the obligation to bargain collectively for all
employees, the union feels that it has the right to the support of all the
employees.
In terms of industrial peace as a desideratum, a umon working under
some form of union security agreement has a most effective disciplinary
control over the employees. Consequently, it is in a better position than
it would otherwise be to be responsible for the adherence of the employees to the terms of the collective agreement (for example, a nostrike clause22). Moreover, responsibility for, and interest in, stability
typically comes from institutions which themselves are secure and
therefore feel that they have a stake in the status quo. A union which
has protective devices to fend off attempts by employers and other
unions to undermine its bargammg position and destroy or weaken its
status has that kind of security
Union security was specifically excluded from the operation of the
Wagner Act. An employer who discriminated against an employee
with regard to hire or tenure of employment in order to discourage or
encourage union membership violated Section 8 (3) and committed
an unfair labor practice. But an employer who discharged an employee
21 At the end of 1946, 4,800,000 workers in the United States were covered by closed
or union shop agreements with preferential hiring provisions. Workers under union
shop agreements without preferential hiring numbered 2,600,000, while 3,600,000 were
under maintenance of membership agreements. 64 MONTHLY LAB. Rav. 765 (1947).
22 For example, the International Typographical Union, which is the oldest national
umon in the United States and has had the closed shop for many years (it has been a
law of the international since 1899), on some occasions when a local struck in violation
of an agreement not only repudiated the local but moved in and furnished the employer
with employees. In some cases the I.T.U. reimbursed publishers for losses suffered by

reason of such strikes. TwENTmrnE
Woms, 64, 66.
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for failure to belong to or maintain good standing in a union which
was undonunated by the employer and had been selected by the employees as their collective bargaining representative was protected by
a proviso, if the collective agreement contained a union security clause
(closed shop or otherwise)
Only one type of union security, an agreement which conditions
employment upon union membership thirty or more days after the
effective date of the agreement or the date of hiring-whichever is
later-is excluded from the operation of the National Labor Relations
Act of 1947 In addition, the agreement may be executed only with or
by a union which has received authorization from a majority of the
employees eligible to vote and may be enforced in only one situation,
namely, when the employee has lost or been denied membership for
non-tender of the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required
by the union.2" This means reasonable fees, since it is elsewhere made
an unfair labor practice for a union to exact excessive fees 2 Moreover, not only is an employer who discriminates against an employee
in order to discourage or encourage union membership guilty of an
unfair labor practice except under the circumstances outlined above,2"
but so is a union or a union agent who causes or attempts to cause the
employer to so discriminate."
Either the employer or the union may be held responsible for the
illegally discharged employee's back pay, depending upon which is
responsible," although the employer is liable in the case of a lawful
union shop agreement illegally enforced only if he had reasonable
grounds for believing that union membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than non-tender of periodic dues and fees.2"
28
24

25

Section 8 (a) (3) Provisos.
Section 8 (b) (5).
Section 8 (a) (3).

28 Section 8 (b) (2).
27 Section 10 (c) Proviso.
28 Section 8 (a) (3) Second Proviso.
The determinative factor in deciding whether or not a discharge was effected in
order to encourage or discourage union membership is motive. The Board cannot order
reinstatement of an individual who was discharged for cause. See § 10 (c) Second
Proviso. Expressions of opinion often help to indicate motive. Yet § 8 (c) says that
the expression of views or opinions shall not be evidence of an unfair labor practice,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. Accordingly, proving a violation of the union security prohibitions of the 1947 statute is much
more difficult than would otherwise be the case. If an employer discharges a nonunion
employee and the Board subsequently issues a complaint charging him with discriminating against the employee in order to encourage union membership, the employer's
statement that "union men are preferred here" is apparently not admissible as evidence
of motive.
Similarly, § 8 (c) makes proof of other kinds of discrimination difficult. What, for
example, can the NLRB do with a case involving the allegedly discriminatory dis-
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The obvious effect of this provision is to render all closed shop
agreements unenforceable either by unions or employers. Moreover,
it has the same impact on union shop contracts unless they are secured
by unions after employee authorization obtained through the operation of the referendum machinery set up by the NLRB. Even then the
agreement is unenforceable except in those cases where employees
have refused to tender dues and fees. In effect, therefore, all a union
can hope to get lawfully under the 1947 statute is an agreement which
gives it a disciplinary weapon helpful in obtaining dues and fees payments. For this reason, the remark that the statute knocks out the
closed shop but leaves the union shop intact is somewhat nisleading."
These provisions of the National Labor Relations Act of 1947 are
the federal implementation of the "right to work" notion which has
produced prohibitive or regulatory statutes and constitutional amendments against union security agreements in a large number of states.3 0
Some of these statutes and amendments render unlawful all forms of
union security, and the Taft-Hartley Act takes cognizance of states'
rights by providing that nothing in the federal law shall authorize the
execution of agreements that make union membership a condition of
employment in any state or territory where such agreements are prohibited by state or territorial law
In other words, an employer and a union in an industry affecting
commerce but located in a state like Arizona, which outlaws all forms
of union security, are estopped from enforcing even the particular
union shop agreement permitted by the NLRA.Y'
charge of a union employee where part of the evidence of motive is a simultaneous, but
noncoercive, anti-union statement made by the foreman who did the discharging?
When asked by Senator Pepper if, in a case where a man was fired on Thursday
and the question was whether he was fired for cause or for union activity, the employer's statement on Monday that he hated labor unions and thought they were a
menace to the country would be admissible in evidence as bearing on motive, Senator
Taft replied. "It would depend upon the facts. Under the facts generally stated by
the Senator, I think that statement would not be evidence of any threat. There would
have to be some other circumstance to tie in with the act of the employer. If the act of
discharging is illegal and an unfair labor practice, consideration of such a statement
would be proper. But it would not be proper to consider as evidence in such a case a
speech which in itself contained no threat express or implied." 93 Cong. Rec. 6603-04
(June 5, 1947).
See Watt, The New Deal Court, Organized Labor, and the Taft-Hartley Act,
7 LA ms Gunm REVImw 213-214.
29 There seems to be little doubt that these sections of the statute render unenforceable all types of union security, including maintenance of membership and preferential
hiring, except the particular type specifically permitted.
80 At least twenty-two states now impose limitations on union security. Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virgina, and Wisconsin.
1 The Arizona Court has upheld the constitutionality of the "Right to Work"
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b. Dual Unonosm. These provisions of the 1947 Act correct an inequity which arose under the Wagner Act in cases of discharge for
so-called "dual unionism." The issue of a discharge for "dual unionism" arose when a collective agreement establishing union security
was in existence and certain employees, disgruntled with the kind of
representation they were getting, campaigned for another union to
succeed the current collective bargaining representative (thus the name
"dual unionism") After these workers had been expelled by the union
for their acts of "disloyalty" and had subsequently been discharged
by the employer pursuant to the union security agreement, the employees or the campaigning union complained of a discriminatory discharge.
Generally the Board, reasoning that-in order to preserve stability
in the collective bargaining relationship-an employee who had been
committed to representation by one union (through application of the
majority principle in an election) ought to be bound to his choice for
a reasonable period of time, refused to hold that such discharges were
discriminatory, that is, designed to encourage or discourage union
membership."2 In cases arising near the end of the life of the agreement, however, the Board, recognizing that an employee ought to have
some power to challenge a union's right to continue as bargaining
representative, found the discharges to be discrimnatory and ordered
the employer to reinstate the employee with back pay, if the employer
knew that the incumbent union's motive was to get rid of adherents
to a rival union."3
By the application of these rules, the employer-union bargaining
relationship was protected by holding employees to their election
choices for a reasonable period of time, just as political voters are held
to their election choices for a given period of time. But a union which
was doing a job of representation unsatisfactory to its constituents was
estopped from perpetuating itself in office.
Amendment to the Arizona Constitution, which reads "No person shall be denied the
opportunity to obtain or retain employment because of non-membership in a labor
organization, nor shall the state or any subdivision thereof, or any corporation, individual or association of any kind enter into any agreement, written or oral, which
excludes any person from employment or continuation of employment because of nonmembership in a labor organization." A state statute provides for injunctive relief and
suits for damages for violation of the Amendment and also declares contracts prohibited
by it to be illegal and void. American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door
Co., 189 P.(2d) 912 (Ariz. 1948).
Accord. State v. Whitaker, 45 S.E. (2d) 860 (N.C. 1947) in which the North Carolina
Court upheld the state anti-closed shop statute.
82 Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 65 NLRB 1 (1946).
83 Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 NLRB 587 (1942).
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The chief' difficulty with the old rules, which was the fault of the
statute, not of the Board, was that only employers were ordered to
make restitution in the form of back pay This was unfair, since the
employer in many of these cases was not in any realistic sense solely
responsible for the discharge. He either complied with the union's
request or faced a paralyzing strike." The new statute corrects this
inequity, permitting the employer to refuse to discharge an employee
who has lost his union membership because of "dual unionism" (making it, in fact, unlawful for him to discharge for that reason). And if the
union retaliates with a strike, it has committed an unfair labor practice.
The chief quarrel with these provisions of the new law is that they
fail to take into account sufficiently the desirability of protecting, the
stability of an existing collective bargaining relationship. They are
designed to permit any employee to shift allegiance and campaign for
another union at any time. Both the union and the employer, although
both may object to the electioneering, are estopped from prohibiting it
without risking charges of an unfair labor practice.
An official change of the collective bargaining representative cannot
occur more than once a year,85 and therefore the "dual unionism" of
the employees cannot nominally affect the status of the parties to the
relationship (the employer and the union) until at least one year has
elapsed (and in the case where a collective agreement is in existence
perhaps not for two years 8 ). However, there is something anomalous
about charging a union on the one hand with the responsibility of
abiding by its promises in the collective agreement (Section 301 of the
statute makes breach of the collective agreement a cause of action)
while on the other hand seriously weakening one of its most effective
disciplinary weapons for seeing that those promises are carried out.
The union not only has lost a good deal of its power to stop the.
employees from freeing themselves from its control as long as they
tender dues and fees, but it may not be able to procure their discharge
for incompetence, wildcat strikes, unauthorized slowdowns, Communism, or anything else other than non-tender of dues or fees.8
34 See NLRB v. Star Publishing Company, 97 F. (2d) 465 (C.C.A. 9th 1938).
85 Section 9 (c) (3).

86 Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 NLRB 927 (1947).
87 The 1947 Act makes it unlawful for a union to cause the discharge of an employee
who has been denied, or expelled from, membership for reasons other than non-tender
of dues or fees; but it does not prohibit causing the discharge of a union member.
Arguably, then, a union may lawfully cause an employer to discharge a member for
incompetence or disloyalty to the union before he is expelled, and then, subsequent to
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Of course, the employer can discharge for cause (which a wildcat
strike presumably would be) without committing an unfair labor practice, but weakening the union's authority over its members (and therefore its status) is hardly the way to make it a "responsible" party to
the collective bargaining process. You do not normally make a group
reliable by promulgating rules based on the assumption that it is unreliable. Sharply curtailing the use of a union's disciplinary controls
over its members, without reference to whether or not there is good
cause for their use, is a rule based upon such an assumption. Certainly
wildcat striking and labor espionage are as good reasons for disciplining a member as nonpayment of dues.
c. The Right to Work, the Closed Union, and Union Democracy.
The right to work is a slogan that is more attractive than substantial.
No one has the right to work in any realistic sense, that is, in the sense
that someone has a duty to give him a job. At best he has only the
expectancy of working if employment is available and he can sell his
services to the hiring agent, frequently-unless there is a strong union
-on the latter's terms.
The basic question is not one of freedom or right, but one of power
-power over hiring, tenure, and the terms of the employment relationship. Statutes which, by outlawing or restricting union security, purport to free individual workers from the power of unions in so doing
leave them subject to the power of employers. In terms of freedom of
employees, it is at least doubtful that they have more freedom when
their job status is controlled solely by employers than when it is controlled solely by unions or by employers and unions jointly The doubt
is even greater if the union is a democratic one in which the members
have a real voice. In modern industrial life the individual freedom with
real meaning is not the freedom of the employee to refuse to support
a union and thus to remain subject to unilateral bargaining with the
employer (frequently an illusory kind of freedom), but the freedom
of the employee to choose the union he wants, to exercise some controls and checks over the leadership of that union, and-at periodic
times-to campaign to change unions. Not even the drafters of the
Labor Management Relations Act suggested that an individual worker
his discharge, effect the expulsion. This device is probably not useful, however, in the
case of a "dual-unionist," for the discharge would discourage membership in the campaigning union and encourage membership in the incumbent union, thus falling within
the prohibitions of the statute. See VAN ARKEL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE L.Ao MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, 31-32 (1947).
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has any freedom of contract or bargaining strength in the all too typical
situation of job scarcity '8
To be sure, unions have sometimes used closed shop agreements as
instruments of abuse. They have sometimes adopted discriminatory'
and even exclusionary admission policies. Moreover, there are sufficient examples of unions operated undemocratically to justify some
criticism that power over workers has-through the growth of unionism-only been shifted from one group of bosses to another, with little
or no industrial democracy in fact.
The problem of the discriminatory refusal by a union which has a
union security agreement to admit certain employees to membership,
thus causing them to lose their jobs or to be refused employment, has
frequently arisen. Negroes, members of other minority groups, and
employees who have campaigned for a union which lost an election
have been among those refused admission. The NLRB was generally
powerless under the Wagner Act to handle the cases involving minority
groups and equally impotent in the latter case, unless the employer in
signing the agreement with the winning union (which he had favored)
knew-and hoped-that it would exclude the campaigners for the losing union. The Board found an employer who discriminated in this
kind of situation guilty of an unfair labor practice."9
88 "The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
"
affects the flow of commerce
"Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively
[restores] equality of bargaining power between employers
and employees."
Excerpts taken from § 1.
89 Wallace Corporation v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
The Board has indicated that it has "grave doubt whether a union which discriminatorily denies membership to employees on the basis of race may nevertheless bargain as
the exclusive representative in an appropriate unit composed in part of members of
the excluded race
If such a representative should enter into a contract requring
membership in the union as a condition of employment, the contract, if legal, might
have the effect of subjecting those in the excluded group, who are properly part of the
bargaining unit, to loss of employment solely on the basis of an arbitrary and discriminatory denial to them of the privilege of union membership. In these circumstances, the validity under the proviso of Section 8 (3) of the Act of such a contract
would be open to serious question." Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53 NLRB
999, 1016 (1943).
For federal judicial treatment of this question under the Railway Labor Act, see
Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). The Court held that a
union which is the exclusive bargaining agent for firemen cannot, in negotiating terms
and conditions of employment, discriminate against Negro firemen, even though they
are not eligible for union membership.
For state judicial treatment of the same question, see James v. Marmship Corp.
25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P.(2d) 329 (1944). The Califorma Court enjoined the enforcement of a closed shop contract held by a umon which excluded Negroes from membership. See also Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.(2d) 831 (1946).
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The new National Labor Relations Act offers a partial solution to
the problem of the closed union by simply weakening the collective
strength of the group. Thus it is illegal for the labor organization with
the permitted union shop agreement to prevent the employment of a
Negro, for example, by denying him admission to the union on purely
discriminatory grounds. The union can keep a Negro out. See Section
8 (b) (i) But it cannot deprive him of employment for that reason.
The undemocratic union is theoretically indefensible, but the correct
therapeutic is to get at the abuses rather than weaken or destroy an
institution (union security) which not only is often free of abuses but
frequently is a useful device for establishing industrial stability Moreover, as against the desire to exalt individual rights in the union is the
hard fact that the leaders of the organization must retain some control
over the members if they are to function effectively as collective bargainers.
The objective is to ensure that the individual union members have
some democratic controls over their leadership without at the same
time destroying the effectiveness of that leadership. Or, to put this
another way, the objective is to have unions which are institutionally
strong but in which the ultimate source of power and control is the
membership.
The new NLRA appears to be designed, not to promote individual
worker freedom by ensuring to them democratic rights within the institutional framework of strong unions, but to promote individual
worker freedom simply by weakening unions institutionally (which is
another way of saying that workers are "freer" when they are less
under the control of unions and more under the control of employersa conclusion that is hard to support with data)
A recent amendment to the Massachusetts State Labor Relations
Act is a more intelligent approach to the problem because it strikes at
the abuses rather than at the institution. That law forbids an employer
to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for nonmembership in a labor union having a union security agreement with
the employer, unless the labor union certifies that the employee was
deprived of membership as a result of a bona fide occupational disqualification or the administration of discipline. The act sets up a
procedure whereby the employee can appeal to the State Labor Relations Commission for a determination of whether or not his suspension,
expulsion, or exclusion from the union was lawful. Expulsion is un-
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lawful under the statute if (3)imposed by the union in violation of its
constitution and by-laws, or (2) imposed without a fair trial, including
an adequate hearing, or (3)imposed when the offense committed by
the employee did not warrant expulsion. Refusal to admit to full
membership is unlawful if it was based on race, creed, color, or sex. 40
The 1947 statute indicates some concern about the internal operations of unions by requiring union compliance with two conditions
other than filing a non-Communist affidavit precedent to acquiring
rights before the NLRB."1 First, the local union and the national or'
international of which it is an affiliate must file with the Secretary of
Labor copies of their constitution and by-laws and a report showing
(i) name and address, (2) the three principal officers and all officers
who received more than $5,ooo the previous year in salary and allowances, the procedure for choosing them, and the amount of their salary
and allowances, (3)
the amount of initiation fees and regular fees and
dues, (4)the qualifications for membership, and (5)data relevant to
elections, meetings, discipline, contract ratification, strike authoriza40 Mass. Acts 1947, c. 657, amending MASS. GEN. LAWS A 1932 c. 150. See also 65
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 280 (1947).
41 § 9 (h) requires each local union officer and each officer of the national or international of which it is an affiliate to submit an affidavit to the NLRB showing that he
is not a member of the Communist Party or any organization that teaches the.overthrow of the government of the United States by force or illegal methods. The sanction
imposed upon unions wich fail to comply with this reqturement (and § 9 (f) and (g),
discussed in the text) is loss of status before the Board. Briefly, this means that a noncomplying union cannot successfully file charges of an unfair labor practice, petition
for a representation election, be certified as a bargaining representative, or petition for
a union shop referendum.
There has been considerable union reluctance to comply with the affidavit requirement. In part this attitude is explained by the "I've-stopped-beating-my-wife" character
of the requirement, but more importantly it is the expression of a feeling on the part
of some powerful and well-entrenched unions that they can protect themselves by selfhelp against employer unfair labor practices, that they are well enough established so
that representation questions will not arise, and the procedure necessary in order to
get a union shop is more trouble than the union shop is worth. Moreover, individual
employees who are members of a noncomplying union can successfully charge employers with all of the unfir labor practices except a refusal to bargain. As of February 29, 1948, 140 international and national unons had complied (seventy-eight of the
A. F of L.'s one hundred and five internationals, twenty-seven of the C.I.O.'s fortyone nationals or internationals, and turty-five unaffiliated organizations, e.g., the
International Association of Machinists). As of the same date 4,307 local unions, less
than ten per cent of the locals i the country, had met the requirement. Report of
Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, SEN. R P. No. 986, 80th Cong. 2nd
Sess. 10 (1948). This degree of noncompliance has seriously complicated and impeded
the operation of the NLRB.
Nonetheless, Communists are losing influence in American unions. But this is due,
probably not to § 9 (h) of the NLRA, but to the conservatism, pragmatism, and realism of the American trade union movement, which by and large is committed to a free
enterprise, capitalistic economy, and to collective bargaining as both an institution and
a technique for resolving labor-management disputes without major alteration of any
of the basic institutional arrangement of our society. See Taft, Attempts to "Radicalise" the Labor Movement, 1 IND. AND LAB. REL. REv. 580 (1948).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

tion, and other methods of operation. In addition, these reports must
be kept up to date annually
Second, the local union and the national or international of which
it is an affiliate must file with the Secretary of Labor a financial report
showing (i) receipts and the sources thereof, (2) assets and liabilities
at the end of the last fiscal year, (3)disbursements during the last
fiscal year, and (4)the purposes for which such disbursements were
made. The union must keep these reports up to date and distribute
them annually to its members "in the form and manner prescribed."
These provisions are inadequate to meet the problem. First, they
do not vest any rights in union members. They extend no guarantees.
They simply provide for registration and distribution of financial
reports by unions which desire rights before the NLRB. Second, the
minority of unions which are undemocratically operated and are in
greatest need of internal reform are, generally speaking, those which
least need the protection of the Board and which have, therefore, the
last reason to comply with the provisions. Third, all a union has to do
in order to meet the registration provision is to tell the Secretary of
Labor how undemocratic it is. There is nothing in the statute that enables the government, employers, or employees to do anything about
a union which elects its officers for life or about union officers who
have the power to expel members arbitrarily 42
The union shop has been authorized in all but a few of the elections
held under the referendum provisions.4 For example, in December of
1947, 521 union shop elections were held, and in 5i8 of them the union
shop was authorized. And 90 per cent of those employees eligible to
vote cast valid ballots, 93 per cent of the valid votes being pro-union
shop. As of February i, 1948, i,66i union shop elections had been
held, and the union had been successful in 1,643 of them.4"
These results do not square with the arguments advanced by the
42 Section 9 (f) (g). Many unions are, of course, operated very democratically.
And the assertion that collective bargaining has merely resulted in the transfer of
arbitrary power over workers from one set of bosses to another undoubtedly is an
overstatement-usually made by persons basically hostile to unions as a poorly disguised but palatably formulated attack on their existence or, at least, on their effective
operation. But undemocratic unions do exist, and the argument that internal union
affairs are of no concern to outsiders has been destroyed by the legislative promotion
of union growth and development, which has vastly increased the scope of union power.
See the suggestions st re democracy in trade unions made by the American Civil
Liberties Union and set out in summary in TELLER, A LABOR POLICY FOR AMERICA,
67-72 (1945). See also Pierson, The Governmient of Trade Unions, 1 IND. AND REL.
REv. 593 (1948).

48 See §§ 9 (e)(1), 9 (e)(2), 8 (a)(3)(ii).
44 Report of Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations. SEN. REP. no. 986,
80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24 (1948).
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sponsors of the Labor Management Relations Act that restrictions on
union security were necessary because the average American worker
was opposed to any form of compulsory union membership."
2. By Law
Consistent with the policy of promoting both the establishment and
maintenance of collective bargaining relationships is the rule that
those relationships should be protected against assaults by unions as
well as by employers. This protection means the imposition of legal
restraints on the self-help activities of unions when they are designed
to force the destruction of a particular collective bargaining relationship which involves a "legitimate" union and has been established by
reference to the wishes of the employees." The National Labor Relations Act of 1947, unlike the Wagner Act, takes some steps in this
direction.
a. Representation Dzsputes. When two or more unions presented
representation claims under the Wagner Act and one of them was
certified or accorded Board recognition at the regional level, the employer had the duty to bargain collectively with it." Yet if the union
that lost in the representation proceedings, even though it had been
soundly defeated in an election, decided to strike and/or picket in
protest over its loss, it could generally do so with immunity from the
remedy of injunction in a federal court because of the NorrisLaGuardia Act."
If the union was a powerful one or could get support from other
unions, the employer was placed in an intolerable position. For example, if the striking union was the Teamsters or the Teamsters
respected the picket line (as in the Swenson case), the employer either
had to commit an unfair labor practice or reconcile himself to going out
of business.
The NLRB held that the striking employees had committed an unlawful act in this situation" and consequently had lost any rights to
reinstatement or back pay, but this ruling was insufficient to protect
the employer against a powerful union.
"1Minority Views of Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations. SEN. REP.
no. 986 (Part 2) 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 10 (1948).
4 A 'legitimate" union, as the term is used here, means one that is not assisted or
dominated
by an employer.
4
7 Section 8 (5).
48 State courts operating under "Baby Norris-LaGuardia Acts" have generally
been intolerant of picketing by a minority union m this situation. For an example, see
Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wn. (2d) 193, 177 P. (2d) 873 (1947).

49 Thompson Products, Inc., 72 NLRB 886 (1947).
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This inequity is corrected in part by Section 8 (b) (4) (C) of the
1947 statute which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor or-

ganization to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to refuse to perform services where an object is to force or
require any employer to recognize or bargain with one union when
another union has been certified."
Moreover, the injured employer is given an opportunity to obtain
reasonably expeditious preliminary injunctive relief by Section io (i),
irrespective of the limitations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Whenever
a labor organization is charged with a violation of Section 8 (b) (4)
(C), the preliminary investigation is to be made "forthwith and given
priority over all other cases except cases of a like character." In addition, whenever the NLRB officer to whom the matter has been referred
has "reasonable cause to believe" that a complaint should be issued,
he must, on behalf of the Board, petition the appropriate federal district court for injunctive relief pending final adjudication by the Board.
The court has jurisdiction to grant such relief as it deems "just and
proper," notwithstanding any other provision of law 1
b. JurisdictionalWork Disputes. A labor organization commits an
unfair labor practice under the 1947 statute if it induces or encourages
the employees of any employer to engage in a strike or a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to refuse to perform services
where an object is to force or require any employer to assign particular
work tasks to the employees of one union rather than to the employees
of another union, unless the employer is failing to conform to a Board
order determining the bargaining representative for the employees.5 "
This section refers to the classical jurisdictional dispute, z.e., a fight
10 As in the case of all conduct prescribed by § 8 (b) (4), a labor organization that
commits this unfair labor practice is open to an action for damages. Section 303 (a) (3).
See also § 303 (a) (1), (2), and (4).
51 Petitioning for injuctive relief if there is reasonable cause to believe that a complaint should be issued is mandatory not only in cases of violations of § 8 (b) (4) (C),
but also in cases involving § 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B). See § 10 (1). In addition, the
General Counsel has the power, after a complaint has been issued, to petition for relief
in all unfair labor practice cases. See § 10 (j). The Norris-LaGuardia Act is not
applicable in any of these instances. Thus the policy of depriving a federal court of
jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in cases arising out of a labor dispute to prohibit
persons from striking, picketing, or causing striking or picketing-regardless of objective, legality, or who asked for the relief (Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.2d 948 (C.C.A.
3rd 1939) , but see United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258
(1947)-is terminated. However, the Norris-LaGuardia Act continues to apply when
an employer seeks injunctive relief in the federal courts.
52 Section 8 (b) (4) (D).
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between two or more unions over who is to have control of certain
work. The other kind of jurisdictional dispute, treated in Section 8
(b) (4)(C) and discussed above, is the quarrel between two or more
unions over which is to have control of certain workers, i.e., which is
to be their collective bargaining representative. The latter dispute is
resolved by resort to the well-established procedure of elections; the
former dispute is now also resolved by the Board.
If the Carpenters' Union strikes a plant because the employer has
awarded the work of dismantling certain machinery to the Machinists'
Union and the employer files a charge, the Board has the duty to hear
and determine the dispute-unless the two unions adjust it or agree
upon methods for adjustment within ten days after the charge has
been served. If the unions reach an adjustment, the charge is dropped."3
If they do not, the hearing is held and an order certifying the union
entitled to jurisdiction is issued. If the parties comply with the certification, the unfair labor practice charge is dismissed. If they do not,
a complaint and a notice of hearing is issued, and a full-blown complaint case is initiated.
Perhaps the basic defect in this section of the statute is the fact that
no provision is established for the resolution of a jurisdictional work
dispute until some kind of self-help technique is utilized by one of the
unions. There is no procedure for resolving the matter before resort
to a strike or a boycott.
However, the provision has produced at least one encouraging result.
An agreement-the impetus for which was furnished by the General
Counsel-establishmg a peaceful procedure for deciding jurisdictional
work disputes has been consummated in the building trades. The arrangement calls for a National Joint Board composed of an impartial
chairman and two representatives from labor and two from management to make binding decisions in these disputes. The procedure has
the advantage of providing for settlement by experts in the industry
rather than by an already overburdened governmental agency, and it
envisages settlement before, rather than after, a work stoppage."
c. Decertification. Under the Wagner Act employees could challenge
the status of an established bargaining agent if they could show substantial support for a rival union. Under Section 9 (c) (i) (A) (ii)
of the new act, employees can challenge the position of the union by
" Section 10 (k).
541 C.C.H. LAB. LAW SERv. 8468 (1948).
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showing substantial employee support 5 for getting rid of it and returning to a nonunion situation.
This section represents an important change in policy and like,
although to a lesser extent, the inclusion in Section 7 of the employees'
right to "refrain from any or all of such [union] activities" indicates
the contradictory aspects of the statute. If there is a public interest in
the establishment and maintenance of collective bargaining, as Section
i says there is, then it seems somewhat anomalous to permit the termination of one collective bargaining relationship without replacing it
with another.
Decertification proceedings are limited, however, not only by the
rule that a representation election cannot be held more than once a
year, 8 but also by the apparent retention of the Board's Wagner Act
policy of refusing to initiate proceedings if there is outstanding a collective agreement of reasonable duration (not more than two years) 11
3. By Self-Help (Protection of Union Standards-Industry-Wide)
Employers who pay union wages are generally, assuming that nonunion wages are lower, at a disadvantage if they must compete in the
products market with employers who pay nonunion wages. Either the
union wage scale has to be reduced, or the employer has to find ways
to offset the disadvantage of his higher labor costs, or the nonunion
plants have to be organized. Historically trade unions have fought
perhaps their hardest legal battles in attempting to persuade courts
that their legitimate economic interests extend throughout the entire
industry in which they are organized. A situation duplicated many
times is the one in which the union is organized in several plants in an
industry and finds it necessary, in order to protect its wage and hour
standards in the organized plants, to exert economic pressures against
the unorganized plants which have, because of lower labor costs, a
competitive advantage in the products market.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act gave recognition to this broad concept
of economic interest as justifying the intentional infliction of harm by
making it clear that a union is involved in a labor dispute and thus
immunized from a federal injunction if it is organized in the industry
in which the dispute occurred, even though it has no members in the
5 Thirty per cent support, according to NLRB Rules and Regs., Series 5, § 202.17
(1947).
58 Section 9 (c) (3).
57 SEm. REP. no. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1947).

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE NLRA

particular plant against which it is directing economic pressure."8
Some states and some state courts followed this lead.59 And the Wagner Act was not to be construed "so as to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike."6 0 As already indicated, the
new NLRA shifts sharply from this policy
a. Secondary Boycotts. Section 8 (b) (4)(A) makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor union to induce or encourage the employees
of any employer to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to refuse to perform services where an
object is to force or require any employer or other person to cease
handling, using, or dealing in the products of another person or doing
business with him.
Consumer aspects of a boycott pressure are not, because of the'
phrase "in the course of their employment," prohibited. Thus it is an
unfair labor practice for the Carpenters and Joiners to induce carpenters in New Orleans to refuse to handle prefabricated housing
materials, the objective being to force contractors to stop dealing with
-the manufacturers of such materials. But it is not an unfair labor
practice for the Carpenters' Union to picket a clothing merchant who
has hired a nonunion contractor to build his house, in order to induce
ns customers to cease buying clothing from im, the ultimate objective
being to coerce the clothing merchant into hiring a union contractor.
However, if other employees, e.g., the Teamsters, respect the picket
line in the course of their employment, the activity will fall within
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) 6
58 47 Stat. 70 and 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. 104, 113 (1940). For examples of "stranger
pressures held nonenjoinable, see Lauf v. Shinner &-Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938), New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S.552, 304 U. S. 542 (1938). For an
example of a consumer boycott pressure held nonenjoinable, see Wilson & Co. v. Birl,
105 F.2d 948 (C.C.A. 3rd 1939). Compare Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U. S.443 (1921) with United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941) as to
changing judicial notions of the scope of a umon's legitimate self-interest and the concept of "labor dispute."
59 For a broad state court interpretation of "labor dispute," see Goldfinger v.
Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937).
60 Section 13.
01
Respecting a picket line is pnvileged in one situation by a proviso of § 8 (b) (4)
(D). Refusig to cross is not an unfair labor practice if the union which established
the picket line is certified and the unon employees are engaged in an,authonzed (not
"wildcat") strike against the plant. Any neutral, e.g., a consumer or a union employee
who does not work m the struck plant, can respect the picket line with impunity, even
though the picketing or the striking has an unlawful objective. However, if an unlawful objective is involved, any union which has employee-members in the plant and
directs them to refuse to cross may become involved in a complaint proceeding. If the
union is not certified or recognized or the strike is unauthorized, unions that induce
their members to respect the picket line, if by respecting it they are refusing in the
course of their employment to handle goods or perform services, may similarly become
involved.
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b. Stranger Pressures. Section 8 (b) (4) (B) makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor union to induce or encourage the employees
of any employer to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to refuse to perform services where an object is to force or
require any other (italics supplied) employer to recognize or bargain
with a union that has not been certified as the employees' collective
bargaining representative.
This provision does not make unlawful the strike to gain recognition
as the bargaining agent. For example, it is lawful for Union X to induce
its employee-members to strike to force their employer to recognize
Union X as the bargaining representative. 2
However, if Union X has no employee-members in the plant, but
does have members in competing plants, and-in order to protect the
union wage scale in the competing plants-it puts a picket line around
the nonunion plant, it may have committed an unfair labor practice.
If other union members, e.g., the Teamsters, respect that picket line,
Union X will have induced them to refuse to perform services in the
course of their employment in order to force an employer (who is not
their own because they have no members employed there) to recognize
or bargain with it.
This provision arguably, therefore, hits at "stranger" picketing and
revitalizes a test of legality which reached its height in Duplex Pnntng
Press Company v. Deertng,8 and its nadir in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act," namely, are the pickets and the picketed employer in a proximate
employer-employee relationship?
Clearly Section 8 (b) (4) (B) makes unlawful the union technique
of refusing to handle goods in order to force the employees of the producer of those goods to join the union and to force the producer to
recognize the union as the bargaining agent.
D. The Duty to Bargain
Achievement of recognition and effective operation as a collective
bargainer is the primary objective of a union. Historically, resistance
82 Inasmuch as procedures are available for the peaceful resolution of recognition
and representation questions, a theoretical case for making unlawful the use of selfhelp to solve such problems can be made. The case breaks down, however, because
determined employer opposition, plus the slowness of the procedure, can result in the
destruction of the position of the union before the Board gets around to settling the
question.
88 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
84 Op Cit. supra note 58. The Norris-LaGuardia Act makes "stranger" picketing
nonenjoinable by a federal court if the picketing union has employee-members in the
industry in which the dispute arose. A labor dispute may exist "regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
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to the process has come from employers. Accordingly, the Wagner Act
-in line with the policy of encouraging the establishment of collective
bargaining relationships and their effective operation-imposed the

duty on an employer in an industry affecting commerce to bargain
collectively with the representative of his employees."5 Since it was
considered incongruous to require an organization to perform the
function which is its primary reason for existence, no such duty was

imposed on labor unions.
However, there is a difference between seeking recognition and status
as a bargaining agent and performing the function of bargaining. And
union refusals to bargain have occurred. For example, in the case of
the Times Publishing Company"' the NLRB held that the Typographers had failed to bargain. As a consequence, since the employer's
good faith could not be tested, a complaint charging him with a refusal
to bargain could not be sustained. This ruling in effect made a union's
refusal to bargain collectively an unlawful act, with the sanction (necessarily negative) being demal of a right under the Wagner Act.
The 1947 statute not only carries over from the Wagner Act the
employer's duty to bargain,' but adds the obligation of a union, provided it is the representative of his employees, to bargain with the
employer. 8 Thus the duty is equated, with the same sanction applicable
to both parties, that is, an affirmative order to bargain.
This change in policy seems entirely defensible. If collective bargaining is to be our national labor policy, there is no reason why both
parties should not have the legal duty to carry it out. Admittedly collective bargaining is essentially a private matter and cannot automatically
be achieved by legislative fiat, and admittedly most of the resistance
has come from employers. But these do not seem to be sufficient reasons for imposing the duty on one party and not on the other, particularly when union refusals to bargain have occurred.
Collective bargaining is defined by the act to mean (i) meeting at
reasonable times, (2) conferring in good faith with respect to (a)
wages, hours, and conditions of employment, (b) negotiation of an
agreement, and (c) questions arising under an agreement, and (3)
execution of a written contract incorporating the agreement reachedif requested by the other party But neither party is compelled to agree
05 Section 8 (5).
6872 NLRB 676 (1947).
67 Section 8 (a) (5).
68 Section 8 (b) (3).
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to a proposal or to make a concession. " This is substantially a codification of the meaning of the phrase as worked out by the Board under
the Wagner Act.
Two important changes are made, however. In the first place, individual employees or groups can now present grievances to the employer
and get them adjusted, without the intervention of the union which is
the collective bargaining representative if (i) the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the collective agreement then in effect and (2) the
union has had an opportunity to be present at the adjustment." This
is an important alteration. The Board held under the Wagner Act that,
although individual employees are entitled themselves to present
grievances to their employer, the union which is the exclusive bargaining agent has the right to be present and negotiate them.7"
The difficulty with this change on its face is its failure to recognize
the interest the union, which is the exclusive bargaining agent, has m
the day-by-day interpretation and application of contract terms, a
process which is involved in the settlement of grievances. One of the
questions, for example, which will arise is: Do precedents worked out
by the employer and his individual employees bind the union in its
grievance-processing?
In the second place, a precise procedure for a certain kind of collective bargaining-to wit, bargaining over an agreement which one
party wants to amend or terminate-is established. - The general
purpose of the requirement is to ensure, each time an agreement is renegotiated, that the parties bargain for at least sixty days without a
work stoppage. The employer (or the union) must give notice of the
desire to terminate or modify sixty days before the expiration date of
the agreement. The party desiring termination or modification must
also offer to meet and confer with the other party If no agreement is
reached in thirty days, that party must notify the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service and the state mediation service, if any, of the
existence of a dispute. The party must also continue the contract in full
force and effect, without resort to strike or lockout, for a period of at
69 Section 8 (d).
70 Section 9 (a).

71 Hughes Tool Co., 56 NLRB 981 (1944), modified and enforced, 147 F. (2d) 69
(C.C.A. 5th 1945).
But the Supreme Court has held, in a case arising under the Railway Labor Act,
that individual employees with a grievance are not bound by a settlement negotiated
by the union in a proceeding to which they were not personally made parties, unless
they clearly authorized, or assented to, settlement by the union in their behalf. Elgin,
Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 (1945).
72 Section 8 (d). Proviso.
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least sixty days after the notice is given. Neither party has, however,
the duty to discuss modification of an agreement if such modification
is to become effective before the agreement can by its own terms properly be reopened.
Violation of any of these duties by either party is an unfair labor
practice. Moreover, any employee who engages in a strike during the
sixty-day period loses isstatus as an employee. It is not clear whether
or not this penalty is imposed on employees in cases where the employer's unfair labor practice caused the strike. But clearly it is imposed on econonc strikers who otherwise would be entitled to
reinstatement at the end of the strike, if they had not been replaced,
and who in any case would retain their status as employees as a protection against discrimination in rehirmg.78
Since most unions and employers bargain sixty or more days before
resorting to self-help, it seems unlikely that this cooling-off period will
have any significant effect in reducing work stoppages, although it
may encourage employers and umons to engage in pre-negotiation conferences prior to adversary bargaining and hence work in that direction.
E. Emphasis of the Statute
Whereas the Wagner Act was rigged in favor of unions, the National
Labor Relations Act of 1947 carries the opposite bias. It is clearly
pro-employer.
Employers can commit five unfair labor practices."4 Labor orgamzations can commit nine or eleven, depending upon whether or not
Sections 8 (b) (i)6 and 8 (b) (4) (A)" are considered to contain
one or two unfair labor practices each. Four or five union unfair labor
practices (depending upon the evaluation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A))
73 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938). Cox, op. cit. Yupra
note 17, at 281, points out another effect of this provision. "Unless the union happens
to retain the support of a majority of the nonstrikers, the employer is excused from
continuing the bargaining which ordinarily offers the best hope of ternmnating a strike;
and, so far as the strikers are concerned, he may employ labor spies, discriminate
against union men, and engage in other acts of interference and coercion aimed at
destroying the union. This would convert the contest into a struggle for group survival
and increase the bitterness and strife."
74 Sections 8 (a) (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5).
75 etin
((1), (2), (3), (4), (A) (B) (C) (D), (5), and (6).
70 It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agent "to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7
or (B) an employer in the selection of us representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances."
77 It shall be an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents to induce or encourage
a strike or a boycott to force "any employer or self-employed person to join any labor
or employer organization" or to force "any employer or other person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person."
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are also grounds for a damage suit." No employer unfair labor practice
is grounds for a lawsuit. Three or four union unfair labor practices
(again depending upon the count of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)) carry a
number one priority before the NLRB 9 and one carries a number two
priority 80 No employer unfair labor practice carries such priorities.
Lastly, the Board must seek preliminary injunctive relief if there is
reasonable cause to believe that a union has violated Section 8 (b)
(4) (A), (B), or (C) and that a complaint should be issued.8 The
Board can, but need not, seek injunctive relief in the case of the five
employer unfair labor practices after a complaint has been issued. 2
In light of the work-load of the NLRB, a priority is a most important
matter. For several years the Board has been falling behind its docket
at a progressive rate. At the end of the fiscal year 1944, 2602 cases
were pending; at the end of 1935, 3244, at the end of 1946, 4605.3

As of August 22, 1947 (when the new NLRA became effective) the
Board had a backlog of 3,933 cases awaiting decision. During the rest
of August and all of September, 621 new cases were filed at the regional
level, during October, 967 cases; during November, 1,38o cases; during December, 2,o6g, and during January, 3,oo8. These figures included unfair labor practice charges and petitions for both representation and union shop elections.8 ' Moreover, the Board estimates that in
the fiscal year from July, 1948, through June, 1949, it will receive about

6o,ooo cases, an average of 5,ooo per month."
The significance of priorities is obvious in light of this large case
load and is demnostrated by the fact that although as of January 3',
1948,

1,316

charges had been filed against employers as against 355

filed against unions,"' more complaints had been issued against unions.
78

Section 303 (a) (1), (2), (3),and (4).
7 Section i0 (1).

NLRB Rules and Regs. Series 5 §§ 203.74, 202.30 (1947).
Section 10 (1).
Section 10 0).
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. Y. State Labor Rel. Board, 330 U. S. 767, 783 (1947).
Report of Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, op. cit. supra note
44, at 6. There is some dispute as to how well the Board is holding its ground. "So far
the Board has been able to dispose of more cases each month than it has received during
such month. It has not, however, been able to appreciably reduce its backlog." Id, at 9.
But cf. Minority Report of Joint Committee on Labor Management Relations, op. cit.
80
81
82
88
84

supra note 45, at 10. "Between August 22, 1947, and February 29, 1948, the NLRB's
backlog of cases rose from 3,933 to 9,500, the largest in the Board's history."
85 Minority Report of Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, op. cit.
supra note 45, at 11.

86 Report of the Joint Committee on Labor Management Relations, op. cit. supra
note 44, at 24. However, the figure of 1,316 is somewhat misleading. In a number of
instances parallel charges were filed by different individual employees against the same
employer. Consequently, the figure 1,316 probably represents about 950 actual cases.
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During the first six months under the Act as of February 29, 1948,
twenty-four complaints were issued against unions and eighteen against
employers."7
The statistics concerning injunctive relief are also revealing. During
the first six months of the statute's operation, thirteen petitions for
injunctions were filed, one against an employer and twelve against
unions. Of the thirteen petitions, two (one against an employer and
one against a union) were sought at agency discretion. The other
eleven, all against umons, were sought under the mandatory provisions
of the Act."
III. CONCLUSIONS
The differences between the Wagner Act and the National Labor
Relations Act of 1947 lie primarily in means and assumptions, not
in objectives. The 1947 statute sets out the same public policy objectives which were contained in the Wagner Act. The only difference
between Section I of the Wagner Act and Section i of the new N-LRA
is that the latter recogmzes that certain kinds of union, as well as
employer, conduct causes labor disputes and industrial unrest which
burdens and obstructs commerce to the impairment of the public interest in the free flow of such commerce.
The 1947 Act appears to weaken the possibility of achieving the
economic objectives set out in Section z in the following major particulars:
x. Assumes that it is a matter of public indifference whether or not
collective bargaining exists in a particular plant or industry
2. Weakens the power of unions to protect their institutional life
against employer hostility by making attacks on all forms of union
security
3. Apparently fails to protect the exclusiveness of the umon's position as the collective bargaining agent.
4. Weakens the power of unions to control the employees for whose
adherence to the collective agreement they are responsible by attacking
all forms of union security
5. Reduces the degree of stability in collective bargaimng relationships by weakening the power of both parties (the employer and the
union) to protect the relationship against destructive attacks made on
it by individual employees or other unions.
s7 Minority Report of Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, op. cit.
fupra note 45, at 14.

g Id., at 18.
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6. Makes inroads into the collective bargaining process itself by
prohibiting certain contract terms (chiefly through the limitation on
union security)
7 Prohibits a union in many situations from attempting to extend its
organizational jurisdiction, even though such an extension is necessary
in order to protect the economic position of the organized employees
and their employer.
8. Gives unions a secondary status before the NLRB, while giving
employers a primary status, apparently on the assumption that unions
have been chiefly responsible for the failures of collective bargaining
in the last twelve years-the result being to impede to some extent the
performance of the Board's function of protecting and extending collective bargaining relationships by channeling its limited resources into
other areas.
The new labor law is consistent with the achievement of the objectives in the following respects:
i.By striking at the closed union and at excessive and discriminatory membership dues and fees makes it clearer that unions with a
strong collective bargaining position must represent all employees.
2. By outlawing a union's coercive attempts to force an employer to
violate a certification either by refusing to bargain collectively or by
discriminating against the members of the certified union places employers in a better position to carry out their statutory duties.
3. By imposing on unions the duty to bargain collectively protects
employers against the "take-it-or-leave-it" position taken by some
powerful unions.
4. By placing some premium on the filing of financial reports and
the registration of facts concerning the internal operations of unions
takes a step toward protecting individual union members.
5. By making unlawful work stoppages resulting from jurisdictional
work disputes and setting up some machinery to handle those disputes
encourages some craft unions to agree to procedures for the settlement
of such matters privately and peaceably

